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Abstract
Based on an extensive synthesis of semi-structured interviews, media content analysis, and 
reviews, this article conducts a qualitative meta-analysis of more than 560 sources of evidence to 
identify 38 visions associated with seven different low-carbon innovations – automated mobility, 
electric vehicles, smart meters, nuclear power, shale gas, hydrogen, and the fossil fuel divestment 
movement – playing a key role in current deliberations about mobility or low-carbon energy 
supply and use. From this material, it analyzes such visions based on rhetorical features such as 
common problems and functions, storylines, discursive struggles, and rhetorical effectiveness. It 
also analyzes visions based on typologies or degrees of valence (utopian vs. dystopian), temporality 
(proximal vs. distant), and radicalism (incremental vs. transformative). The article is motivated by 
the premise that tackling climate change via low-carbon energy systems (and practices) is one of 
the most significant challenges of the twenty-first century, and that effective decarbonization will 
require not only new energy technologies, but also new ways of understanding language, visions, 
and discursive politics surrounding emerging innovations and transitions.
Keywords
energy discourse, futures, imaginaries, sociotechnical transitions, visions
Introduction
Visions and narratives of energy futures have become a particularly powerful force in 
research, being present in the construction of energy and climate scenarios, forecasts, 
and policy analysis (O’Neill et al., 2017; Sovacool, 2019). Outside of the research com-
munity, business analysts, regulators, titans of industry and inventors (among others) 
continually devote a significant amount of effort towards developing and deploying 
futuristic narratives and images for political and economic ends. In the public domain, 
users, consumers, citizens and the media also frequently invent, modify, circulate and/or 
resist such narratives (Mason, 2006). Such visions serve symbolic but also instrumental 
ends, soliciting public, political, and even financial support for a variety of low-carbon 
technologies (Curran, 2012; Delina and Janetos, 2018; Fortes et al., 2015). Visions, fan-
tasies and narratives therefore have relevance for all stakeholders who are concerned 
about energy and climate policy decisions, including innovation, technology choice and 
commercialization.
Notwithstanding their prominence and importance, little academic work has attempted 
to engage the topic of visions and fantasies empirically or theoretically in a systematic 
and comparative manner, while at the same time connecting them to pressing policy 
concerns such as low-carbon transitions. Our awareness of this research gap comes from 
the work of a five-year research center – CIED, the Centre on Innovation and Energy 
Demand – examining innovation and energy demand from a socio-technical and whole 
systems approach, in which most of the authors were involved, and where most of the 
case studies were conducted. Readers can look to CIED (2019) for an overview, to Geels 
et al. (2018) for CIED’s overall research strategy and to Jenkins and Hopkins (2019) for 
its flagship output, a book.
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This article examines 38 distinct visions associated with seven different innovations 
– automated mobility, electric vehicles, smart meters, nuclear fission, shale gas, hydro-
gen, and the fossil fuel divestment movement – each of which plays a key role in current 
deliberations about future energy supply and use. The article examines:
1. Rhetoric, or the ideographs, narratives, symbolic cues and recurring phrases that 
support or weaken the discursive appeal of a particular low-carbon innovation,
2. Agents, or the problems, actors, characters and plotlines (including the technol-
ogy being the hero, or nature or climate being the villain, for instance) involved 
in articulating such visions, and
3. Strategies and contestations, or how such visions and discourses interact with 
agents and each other, especially in response to external selection pressures and 
the evolution of competing narratives.
The article is motivated by the premise that tackling climate change via low-carbon 
energy systems (and practices) is one of the most significant challenges of the 21st cen-
tury, and that success will require not only new energy technologies and other innova-
tions, but also new ways of understanding language, visions and discursive politics that 
define new futures. Sovacool and Brossmann (2013: 211) have noted that imaginings of 
energy technologies play an important role in decisions made about such technologies, 
presenting a ‘critical social facet of energy transitions’. Cozen et al. (2018: 289) write: 
‘A sustainable future depends on how we think about, communicate about, and use 
energy’ (emphasis added). This paper therefore both identifies a collection of novel 
emerging visions and seeks to advance our conceptual understanding of how such visions 
differ in terms of their rhetorical features, valence, temporality, and radicalism.
The article’s methodology is based on an extensive synthesis of evidence and analysis 
including semi-structured interviews, media content analysis, and systematic reviews. The 
article is inherently cross-technological in its examination of visions, looking at low-car-
bon technologies across the domains of electricity supply, transport and mobility, industry, 
and household energy use. It is spatially and temporally comparative, examining several 
specific geographic contexts where such visions and narratives play out: nationally in the 
United Kingdom, regionally in Eastern Europe, and globally in the epistemic communities 
connected to nuclear power, divestment, and automated mobility. Taken together, this 
allows us to consider a broad range of visions and narratives expressed in a variety of ways, 
each seeking to shape some aspect of our future energy landscape.
Conceptual approach: Visions, fantasy, ideographs and cues
The core terms and concepts in the study – vision, fantasy, ideograph, and cue – inter-
relate. It is helpful to define each in turn, with a summary offered by Table 1.
Visions deploy stories, narratives, or scenarios that reveal fundamental patterns of 
human reasoning, and how humans communicate their thinking to others, in a future 
oriented context. Berkout (2006) argues that visions can play at least five different, 
important and active roles. They can:
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•• map a possibility space by identifying a realm of plausible alternates and the 
means for reaching them,
•• offer a heuristic device for revealing the specific problems that need to be resolved 
in order for a vision to be realized,
•• enable the identification of stable frames for target setting and monitoring 
progress,
•• specify metaphors and relevant symbols, narratives, or moralities that bind 
together different stakeholder groups, or
•• bring together capital, knowledge, networks, skills, and other resources so that 
action can be coordinated and focused.
Such articulated visions are simultaneously rational and allegorical, reflecting the ability 
to story-tell and construct myths as much as to reason, and showing that reality is sym-
bolically mediated (Brown et al., 2000; Miller et al., 2015; Noppers et al., 2014).
Our use of the term fantasy is more precise: it refers to ‘a storyline that captures the 
human need to experience and interpret drama’. For Bormann (1972), ‘fantasy’ refers to 
the way that communities of people share their social reality, a creative interpretation of 
events that fulfill a psychological and rhetorical need. It is not to be mistaken for some-
thing that is necessarily imaginary or pejorative. Fantasies often have ‘symbolic cues,’ 
recurring phrases, terms, or slogans such as ‘my precious.’ In contrast to Bormann, we 
focus almost exclusively on the narrative dimension of fantasy. As a guiding lens, we 
rely on a particular type of fantasy, one of utopianism and dystopianism. Michael (2000: 
23) notes:
Representations of the future are from the outset engaged in a sort of pre-emptive argumentation 
over whether the projected state of affairs leads to good or bad … Representations of a good 
future can be charged with ‘talking up’ the future - that is, the enunciation of a particularly 
positive future can generate ‘optimism’ (or bullishness in markets). Similarly, a slight hint of 
negativity regarding the future can precipitate panic.
Utopian visions of technology have been explored in the academic literature more than 
dystopian visions. Berkout (2006: 302) writes: ‘[U]topias represent examples of radical 
Table 1. Key terms used in this study.
Term Definition
Vision A description of what could occur in the near-term, mid-term, or long-term 
future. While shaped by ideological constraints, visions reveal alternative 
narratives or futures, thus inviting contestation within themselves, and 
between alternative perspectives
Fantasy A narrative that dramatizes a vision, making it salient to audiences through 
dramatic devices and/or recurring themes
Ideograph A term of cultural and political collective commitment that embraces historical 
norms sufficiently to guide subsequent discourse.
Cues Key words or phrases that resonate symbolically with particular audiences.
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and more fully worked visions of the future. Their aim is to break the bonds of the exist-
ing order, to exemplify an alternative order and to inform collective action in pursuit of 
that order.’
Yet Segal (1994, 2005) offers an alternative view of ‘technological utopia’ as a mode 
of thought that promotes technology as bringing about a perfect society. For instance, 
Eames et al. (2006) show how visions of a hydrogen economy touch upon six overarch-
ing utopian themes such as:
•• ending dependence on insecure supplies of energy,
•• decentralizing energy via community ownership of energy systems and smaller 
and more distributed sources of supply,
•• fundamentally reforming social values towards sustainability,
•• allowing humanity to retain its current lifestyles,
•• harnessing technical progress, knowledge, and innovation, and
•• creating employment and staying in the international race for economic 
competitiveness.
The utopian elements of technological fantasies have therefore led proponents and spon-
sors to exaggerate potential benefits and downplay risks of many different technologies 
(Corn, 1986; Sturken et al., 2004). Marvin (1988) warns that technological utopianism 
can also promote a ‘cognitive imperialism’ where social and political relations become 
reduced and technologically determined. Hornsey and Fielding (2016) analyzed reac-
tions to different messages addressing global warming, and found that optimistic or uto-
pian messages reduce the sense of risk from global warming, and its associated distress, 
and are less successful in motivating action than pessimistic messages.
Utopian and dystopian fantasies shaped by ideographs, powerfully recurring themes 
or ideologies behind visions. McGee (1980) originally developed the concept of an ideo-
graph to explain how language, or rhetoric, can reinforce or linguistically implement 
ideology, or power, by manipulating mass consciousness. According to him, human 
beings are ‘conditioned’ to a vocabulary of concepts that function as guides, warrants, 
reasons or excuses for behavior and belief. An ideograph is defined (McGee, 1980: 15) 
as ‘a high order abstraction, representing collective commitment to a particular but 
equivocal and ill-defined normative goal. It warrants the use of power, excuses behavior 
and belief which might otherwise be perceived as eccentric or antisocial, and guides 
behavior and belief into channels easily recognized by a community as acceptable and 
laudable.’ McGee suggests that ideology is in practice a political language composed of 
ideographs that signify a collective commitment. Andsager (2000: 578) sees ideographs 
as ‘special words or phrases that express public values’, and Berkout (2006: 307) under-
stands them as a ‘set of guiding concepts representing unifying ideas and ideals’. 
Examples include deploying the words ‘natural’ and ‘sustainable’ as they relate to prod-
ucts and practices, with all of the social context or judgments those words imbue.
Ideographs about technology signify a baseline of public and political commentary, 
and often relate to common rhetorical tropes such as ‘freedom’, ‘quality’, ‘prosperity’, 
and ‘safety’. Van Lente (2000) muses that perhaps the most prominent ideograph con-
nected to technology has been that of ‘continual progress’, an idea reaching as far back 
6 Social Studies of Science 00(0)
as the Enlightenment in the 1700s. Liao (2012) similarly identifies ideographs connected 
to augmented reality technologies such as ‘education’ or ‘privacy violations’. In our 
analysis below, we extend this work and identify no fewer than fourteen ideographs: 
progress & innovation, efficiency, profit & economic growth, environmental sustainabil-
ity, safety, liberty & autonomy, employment, education, privacy, duty & responsibility, 
resistance, national security, inevitability, and authoritarianism.
Since all words are symbols that provide meaning for a referent, the category of cues 
is clearly the broadest. Cues represent words or phrases that trigger contextual knowl-
edge for people actively involved in a relevant conversation or vision.
Toward this end, our four concepts interrelate, as ideographs are necessarily cues, but 
they represent an extremely narrow set of terms whose meaning is grounded in the ideo-
logical assumptions of an audience. Ideographs are so rooted in a people’s collective 
belief system that they serve to as perceptual filters for everyone within a collective, 
regardless of power. An ideograph is a cue whose meaning is culturally ingrained; due to 
historical usage, its meaning is thought to be universally accepted and generally beyond 
challenge (although unspecified differences within cultures remain). Who can object to 
progress? Invoking ‘progress’, though, can strategically obscure important questions 
(progress for whom, in what way, at what cost?). Cues tend to work as perceptual blin-
ders (Burke, 1945, 1950, 1966), prompting audiences to look at issues from a particular 
perspective and obscuring other views. Visions are also limited by ideological con-
straints, but they can embrace specific interpretations of our collective agreements in 
efforts to provide alternative views of potential futures. To make those visions more 
appealing to people who tend to embrace narrative decision-making processes, fantasies 
use drama to tether the visions to dramas and recurring themes with which people iden-
tify. These fantasies tend to use recurring themes or plots to articulate their stories.
Moreover, our examination of visions, fantasies, ideographs and cues yields similar 
insights to work that focuses on narratives and imaginaries, albeit with differing results 
and emphasis. A narrative, in its broadest sense, refers to a carefully crafted or mobilized 
story or an account of events (Miller, 2012). While all visions are thus a form of narra-
tives, many narratives fall outside the scope of vision. Visions refer to a specific type of 
narrative focused only on a desirable or undesirable future. Imaginaries refer to ‘collec-
tively held, institutionally stabilized, and publicly performed visions of desirable futures, 
animated by shared understandings of forms of social life and social order attainable 
through, and supportive of, advances in science and technology’ (Jasanoff, 2015: 4). The 
pioneering work of Jasanoff and Kim (2009, 2013) has revealed such imaginaries around 
the use of nuclear power in South Korea and the United States. However, our visions do 
not fit neatly within the imaginaries concept because they are often institutionally unsta-
ble, undesirable, and unsupportive of advances in science and technology. We thus view 
our approach to low-carbon visions as a complement to, rather than a substitute for, 
ongoing research on narratives and imaginaries.
Research design: Selection of low-carbon innovations and 
qualitative meta-analysis
To explore the discursive dimensions of energy visions and fantasies, we relied on a 
comparative approach that examined seven different low-carbon innovations. To do so, 
Sovacool et al. 7
we are building on our collective earlier work (see Table 2), although the synthetic and 
comparative analysis presented here is entirely new.
We selected seven distinct low-carbon innovations covering different scales or sectors 
(households, industry, transport), services (electricity, mobility, freight), fuels (fossil, 
nuclear, renewable), and types of innovation (technical, social). Three of these deal with 
energy use and demand, or the ‘prime movers’ of energy or mobility services:
(a) Automated vehicles,
(b) Battery electric vehicles, and
(c) Smart meters.
Three of these deal with the supply or storage of low-carbon energy:
(d) Nuclear fission (electricity),
(e) Shale gas (electricity and heat), and
(f) Hydrogen (energy storage).
Table 2. Summary of technological case studies and methods for this meta-analysis.
Innovation Method of data 
collection*





(a)  Automated 
mobility
Content analysis of 
freight industry and 
mass media documents
Global 107 Hopkins and 
Schwanen, 2018a, 
2018b
(b)  Battery 
electric 
vehicles
Content analysis of 
major scenarios and 
forecasts about electric 
vehicles and low-
carbon vehicles
United Kingdom 16 Bergman, 2017, 
2018; Bergman 
et al., 2017
(c)  Smart 
meters
Content analysis of 
broadsheet and tabloid 
newspaper articles




(d)  Nuclear 
power
Research interviews United Kingdom 36 -
(e)  Shale gas 
fracking
Research interviews Eastern Europe 74 Goldthau, 2018; 
Goldthau and 
Sovacool, 2016
(f) Hydrogen Content analysis of 
project documents and 
public media (52) and 
interviews (62)
United States 114 Sovacool and 
Brossmann, 2010
(g) Divestment Research interviews Global 12 Bergman, 2018
*Refers to material collected through the duration of a five-year research effort known as the Centre on 
Innovation and Energy Demand.
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A final one deals with social innovation or grassroots activism:
(g) Fossil fuel divestment.
In choosing these innovations, and not others, we were working with empirical mate-
rial we had collected previously in our research. That said, we also wanted to avoid 
low-carbon innovations that had already been analyzed for their visions and discourse, 
notably clean coal (Kuchler and Bridge, 2018; Marshall, 2016; Rafey and Sovacool, 
2011), biofuel (Fatimah 2015; Kuchler, 2014; Levidow and Papaioannou, 2013), wind 
energy (Jepson et al., 2012; Karlsen, 2018; Korsnes, 2016), and solar energy (Cloke 
et al., 2017; Curran, 2012; Phillips and Dickie, 2014; Rosenbloom et al., 2016; Simmet, 
2018). We also wanted to choose innovations seen as having significant potential to 
actually reduce carbon emissions within the next few decades. Automated vehicles and 
electric vehicles have been recently advanced as a means to dramatically decarbonize 
the transport sector and even ‘revolutionize’ mobility (Axsen and Sovacool, 2019; 
Sperling, 2018). Smart meters, nuclear reactors, shale gas and hydrogen all feature 
centrally in projections about low-carbon energy use undertaken by the International 
Energy Agency (2019a) and the European Commission’s (2017) Strategic Energy 
Technology Plan. The carbon footprint of shale gas production remains expressly sub-
ject to long-standing contestations (e.g. Cathles et al., 2012; Howarth et al., 2011). 
Nevertheless, unconventional energy has contributed to a surge in global LNG trade, 
and in some contexts globally available natural gas is considered an important ‘bridge 
fuel’ to a low-carbon future (IEA, 2019b). The December 2019 political agreement on 
an EU-wide classification system for sustainable investments in principle also recog-
nizes nuclear power as a transitional fuel (making it, however, contingent to a set of 
‘do no significant harm criteria’) (European Commission, 2019). Fossil fuel divest-
ment has been heralded as ‘particularly pertinent’ to financing the global low-carbon 
energy transition (Halstead et al., 2019).
Moreover, our selection of these seven innovations reflects fairly new innovations or 
phenomena that have grabbed public and policy attention and been reported widely, 
making them more amenable to studying visions. While electric vehicles and automated 
vehicles are both linked to energy use in transport, the former is generally envisioned as 
an energy efficiency innovation and the latter as a more radical shift in mobility patterns. 
While most low-carbon visions of the future rely on technology, we thought it important 
to consider a non-technological case study. Fossil fuel divestment is thus a social innova-
tion envisioning new forms of democracy and economics.
Given that we had the benefit of drawing from research as part of a five-year research 
center, we were able to draw on a rich collection of empirical material spread across 
multiple projects. We were able to analyze transcripts of original semi-structured research 
interviews (related to fission, shale gas, divestment), the results of extensive document 
or media content analysis (related to automated vehicles, smart meters, hydrogen), and 
reviews of scenario analysis (related to battery electric vehicles), as summarized in Table 
2. We frame this type of analysis a ‘qualitative meta-analysis’. From this original mate-
rial, we identify a collective 38 distinct visions that we then analyze and discuss in terms 
of their common visions, cues, narratives, and ideographs.
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Results: The discursive dynamics of seven low-carbon 
innovations
The seven innovations and 38 visions gave rise to a rich mosaic of cues, ideographs, and 
discursive struggles, or contested visions. Here, we briefly outline each vision in turn, with 
summary data (and frequency counts) presented in Table A1 in the Supplementary Material.
Automated mobility
Our material revealed seven visions for automated mobility: (1) effortless freight, (2) the 
educated trucker, (3) entrenched automobility, (4) transformers, (5) a perilous distrac-
tion, (6) infrastructural overhaul, and (7) mass unemployment. Three of the visions fea-
ture the driver, while four do not. Of the three that prioritize the driver, one envisions 
automation as a boon for drivers, while two do not. The other four visions prioritize 
industrial and infrastructure concerns.
Effortless freight. This vision emphasizes efficiency gains for the mobility of goods or 
freight. It points to current inefficiencies – relating to the driver (e.g. driving hours 
restrictions), vehicle use (e.g. unproductive time during breaks), empty loads, and fuel 
consumption – and how these can be overcome, leading to increased profitability. Our 
research sources mention that ‘a 400 percent price performance improvement’ is possi-
ble, given that robots and artificially intelligent beings can ‘drive more economic effi-
ciency’ and that ‘robots don’t mind going 45 mph’. The unemployment caused by 
removing human drivers is framed in this vision as an opportunity to reduce costs and 
increase productivity. Benefits for consumers are also articulated.
The educated trucker. This vision centers on the role of the human driver, reconfiguring 
this role as a highly skilled position akin to a ship’s captain or an airplane’s pilot. This 
vision focuses on the ongoing importance of human interaction through the freight 
industry, with drivers acting as customer service agents and representatives of the com-
pany on route. It suggests that aspects of the job that require least skill will be automated 
first, and therefore retain the ‘highly skilled’ components: ‘drivers are … among the 
primary beneficiaries’ of automation and that there would be ample ‘opportunities for 
truck drivers to take on higher skilled roles’. This vision is likely to have emerged in 
response to industry concern about employment.
Entrenched automobility. This vision points to the evolution and emergence of automated 
technologies, and creates a vision of incremental innovation that is both inevitable and 
gradual, offering a future that is commensurable with the present. This vision notes the 
adoption of automated technologies – micro automations – in freight vehicles. Source 
material noted that automation would underpin ‘stepping stones on the same path’ to 
automobility and ‘piece by piece’ change. Technologies such as lane assist, cruise control 
and automatic braking are framed as early steps in automation. It therefore unpacks the 
‘automated vehicle’ to show the variety of technologies that sit within. This vision 
reduces the radicalness of the innovation of automated vehicles by suggesting that they 
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are a continuation of the technologies experienced today and therefore the future is not 
likely to be radically different.
Transformers. This vision somewhat contradicts the incrementalism inherent in 
‘entrenched automobility’ by signaling the exceptionalism and transformative potential 
of automated vehicles. It draws parallels from science fiction to depict a future of robotic 
and technological dominance. It goes further to suggest that such a future is ‘just around 
the corner’, and it focuses on and highlights scientific and engineering capabilities to 
enable such transformations, and builds excitement around the innovations as ‘future 
technologies that are available today’. The vision talks about how ‘science has well and 
truly caught up with fiction’ and that we will soon see a future that is ‘more Optimus 
Prime than human’, ‘R2D2–like’, and resembling of ‘a scene from Blade Runner’. 
Through such stories, this vision draws the future into the present and offers suggestions 
of radical transformation and new ways of being mobile and moving freight.
A perilous distraction. This vision problematizes the future orientation of automated vehi-
cles, and their capacity to respond to current challenges of the mobility system at large, 
and the freight industry more specifically. It directly clashes with the transformers vision 
by emphasizing the long timeframes for development of automated vehicles, arguing that 
current challenges require imminent attention. Rather than waiting for technological 
innovation, these advocates contest the transformer fantasy and argue for increasing 
attention to driver recruitment and retention due to low pay and conditions, low profit 
margins, relative costs of fuel, and regulatory changes. Those advancing this vision note 
that ‘drivers have never said “I do too much” or that “I’m too distracted”,’ and that ‘the 
driver recruitment/retention issue is primarily about respect and pay’.
Infrastructural overhaul. This vision stresses the system-wide change that is required for 
automated vehicles to be operational, and questions the focus on technological and vehi-
cle capabilities, especially its cost and resources involved. This vision notes the need for 
regulatory as well as infrastructural and perceptual changes that would be required for 
automated vehicles to become widespread. It talks about ‘preparing road infrastructure’ 
and ‘painting its lane stripes six inches wide, instead of the standard four, and repainting 
them annually’. This vision notes the high-tech (e.g. ‘smart roads’) and low-tech (e.g. 
‘line paint’) that may become part of the system of automated mobility, and signals the 
failures of the technology where these infrastructures are not compatible. This vision 
therefore suggests it will take a great deal of effort to make an automated reality 
vehicle-ready.
Mass unemployment. This vision, contrary to that of the ‘educated trucker,’ relates to the 
deskilling of truck drivers, and the potential for technological unemployment and dis-
placement of freight operators, and wider system workers, due to automated vehicle 
innovation. The vision is one of a ‘driverless’ freight future, and assumes technological 
capabilities for deliveries without human interference. This, however, threatens to make 
trucking jobs ‘obsolete’ resulting in ‘massive labor loss that can’t be blamed on trade or 
regulation but solely on technology’, in the extreme it could ‘abolish almost all the 
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driving jobs’ and ‘the long-haul driver becomes more akin to cartoon buffoon Homer 
Simpson’. This vision is concerned with the widespread unemployment of professional 
drivers and the associated ‘humiliation’ of deskilled workers who remain in highly auto-
mated freight industry work.
Battery electric vehicles
Six visions arose from our material on electric vehicles (EVs): (8) entrenched automobil-
ity, (9) the electric society, (10) the decarbonized grid, (11) a revitalized economy, (12) 
the reluctant and anxious consumer, and (13) technological disappointment. The visions 
differ substantively in whether they view EVs as reinforcing conventional patterns of 
automobility or reforming it.
Entrenched automobility. In this vision, EVs offer a continuation of private automobility 
as usual. The need for emissions reduction is met in the short term through improvements 
in conventional vehicles, and only later through introduction of hybrids and electric vehi-
cles (or other low-emission vehicles). The emphasis is on gradual, step-by-step change. 
The slow changeover allows incumbent manufacturers to continue making and selling 
conventional cars while adapting to make new types of cars, minimizing systemic change 
and eliminating the need for behavioral change beyond buying a different type of car. 
The vision emphasizes how ‘the future car market will be dominated by offerings from 
traditional [manufacturers] who will use their knowledge and experience, and their 
understanding of customer desires, together with economies of scale, to develop cost-
effective new models with gradually increasing use of electrification’. ‘[C]onventionally 
powered petrol and diesel cars will remain with us for a long time yet, and that the lion’s 
share of emissions reductions in the short to medium term will come from their improve-
ment.’ Importantly, there are no shocks to the system, no disruption. The transport sys-
tem continues with little change to the high-demand, private-car owned configuration.
The electric society. By contrast, in this vision, new market entrants take advantage of 
opportunities offered by EVs that lead to radical changes. New functionalities, like ICT 
connectivity, and innovative, lighter and smaller cars, allow for new designs that take off 
in urban areas first. EVs cause a disruption in the transport system, and the change is not 
just technological, as the role of the car is redefined in society, with more opportunities 
for a linked-up, intelligent system. This vision suggests that ‘the exploitation of the full 
potential of electric cars requires total revision of the automobile concept’ and that ‘the 
successful introduction in to the market of EVs and PHEVs is not merely an evolution of 
the existing vehicle market, but a transformation of it’.
The decarbonized grid. This vision centers not on the implications EVs have on mobility 
patterns, but instead on the environment, defined narrowly as reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions. In this framing, electric vehicle purchase is seen as consumer engagement 
with climate change. The vision notes how ‘increasing electrification of powertrains is 
widely regarded as the most likely route to achieving GHG reduction targets for passen-
ger cars’ and that ‘significant growth in the electric vehicle market [is] required to meet 
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future carbon budgets, and to be on the cost-effective path to economy decarbonization’. 
Part of this vision involves further technical innovation in terms of vehicle-to-grid sys-
tems, so that EVs can ‘offer potential to balance the grid, as their charging could be 
turned on and off, and secondly vehicle-to-grid (or house) could offer temporary 
storage’.
A revitalized economy. This vision focuses more on how EVs will accrue enhanced 
employment opportunities, economic competitiveness and growth, especially for the 
United Kingdom (where we conducted our assessment). The UK could become ‘a leader 
in some areas of the electric vehicle market’ and over the long term could even play a 
globally ‘strong role in future electric systems’. A shift to EVs would capitalize on ‘com-
parative advantage’ and ‘create jobs, rebalance the British economy towards manufactur-
ing and exports, and promote sustainable economic growth in the UK’. This vision also 
stresses the links between transport and economy, as ‘road transport will continue to be 
a critical component of human mobility and economic growth around the world’. Unlike 
the other visions, this one is grounded in very precise forecasts, with ‘domestic growth 
in the production of plug-in electric vehicles to the levels predicted by the Smart Grid 
Forum could create gross value added of £16.5 billion in the UK by 2030, and £52 billion 
by 2050’, helping secure 470,000 jobs as well by the 2040s.
The reluctant and anxious consumer. In this vision, people themselves stunt the potential 
of EVs. They could be reluctant, ignorant or anxious, failing to take up the new technol-
ogy, endangering either the successful transformation of the personal vehicle market or 
the successful reduction in emissions. People are depicted as not seeing the benefits of 
EVs, in which case they need to be ‘educated’, with a noted ‘gap between people’s atti-
tudes towards the environment and their actions through their choice of vehicle and the 
way they drive.’ The vision looks at behavior from a ‘rational actor’ perspective, suggest-
ing that ‘people tend to discount heavily (or not take into account) future cost savings 
from fuel economy at the time of purchasing a car, even though it would seem to be in 
their own interests’. Further, a recurring theme within this vision even problematizes 
users through the irrationality of ‘range anxiety’.
Technological disappointment. In this vision, EV technology fails to deliver on its prom-
ises. It suggests that ‘electric cars will remain confined to niche markets such as special 
purpose vehicles and delivery fleets in inner city areas’. This is mostly down to uncer-
tainty over things like vehicle performance, batteries, and charging infrastructure, and 
the competition with the internal combustion engine. According to this vision, ‘big ques-
tion marks still remain over how [EVs] will perform after several years in terms of day-
to-day wear and battery rundown’ and ‘the future mass-market success of electric 
vehicles is highly dependent on breakthroughs in this field’. Similarly, the costs of the 
charging infrastructure necessary to support EVs are seen as financially restrictive, given 
that ‘[EVs] are not designed with the UK electricity network in mind’. This means con-
tinued use of conventional cars in the short and medium term. Some documents suggest 
that while EVs might fail, cars powered by other low-carbon technologies, such as 
hydrogen or biofuels, succeed.
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Smart meters
Six visions also arose from our smart meters material: (14) empowered consumers, (15) 
the low-carbon grid, (16) future smart innovation, (17) costly disaster, (18) the hacked 
and vulnerable grid, and (19) families in turmoil. The competing visions highlight the 
discursive struggle over whether smart meters benefit or harm consumers.
Empowered consumers. This vision presents smart meters as a pathway towards creating 
more empowered consumers. This empowerment can come from a variety of means, 
including more accurate household energy bills, prosuming through micro-generation at 
home, easier management of energy use, ending of debt related to energy bills, choosing 
favorable tariffs, easier switching between suppliers and, best of all, cutting energy bills 
in the home. The vision suggests that smart meters are key to making energy visible in 
the home and helping householders make changes to their daily energy routines to reduce 
energy bills and carbon emissions. The link between visibility, awareness and changed 
routines is described as ‘empowering’ householders, i.e. fundamentally changing how 
they relate to, engage with and use energy.
The low-carbon grid. This vision explicates the carbon and environmental credentials of 
smart meters. Our source material described how the rollout of smart meters would result 
in Britain’s energy system becoming low-carbon. Smart meters are considered to be 
enabler of a smart grid and therefore opening up opportunities for increasing low-carbon 
electricity such as from wind and solar. The vision also includes the possibility of inte-
grating smart meters with energy storage, and that national benefits could accrue beyond 
carbon, such as a smarter and more secure grid.
Future smart innovation. This vision emphasizes the contributions that smart meter rollout 
could offer for industry, innovation, and economic competitiveness. A consistent theme 
was that smart meters enable smarter services and business models that could increase 
competition and innovation in the energy market, for instance, creating opportunities for 
innovative services to be developed, such as time of use tariffs that could also make 
energy more affordable. Smart meters are linked to smart grids and smart cities futures, 
leading ultimately to visions where they could enable grids that incorporate information 
and communication technologies to enhance performance to reduce resource consump-
tion and overall costs. This would lead to ‘an alluring vision of the future, in which civic 
technology such as traffic lights, smart meters for utilities and public transport could all 
be connected and the feedback the of data online invaluable’.
Costly disaster. This vision depicts the smart meter rollout as a ‘costly disaster’. Here, 
smart meters are envisioned as a publicly funded technological and financial calamity 
with inconclusive benefits for consumers, and with outdated and faulty technologies 
being rolled out to nearly every household in the UK. The national program is considered 
to be highly complex, where costs might be a lot higher than calculated in current impact 
assessments; it is a ‘disaster waiting to happen’ or ‘over-engineered and mind-blowingly 
expensive’. This leads to calls from differing actors for the entire program to be halted, 
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altered and/or cancelled. The vision also elaborates on a diverse set of technological dif-
ficulties (e.g. lack of interoperability between suppliers’ meters and technological 
obsolescence).
Hacked and vulnerable grid. This vision notes how smart meters could result in a national 
energy system subject to hacking or vulnerable to criminals. Part of it also emphasized 
vulnerability as a sort of dystopian ‘Big Brother’ narrative highlighting how smart meters 
would enable utilities to investigate people’s energy consumption in the home to the 
point where privacy was invaded. The vision warns how plans to install smart energy 
meters in every house will leave families vulnerable to ‘hacker attacks’, creating a poten-
tial risk to individual homes, municipal buildings and even whole districts. One source 
even characterized such hacking possibilities as comparable to a ‘nuclear strike’, sug-
gesting malicious hackers would be able to cut off whole national electricity grids. The 
vision also suggests that ‘we will see Big Brother taking over our homes as power com-
panies get to micro-manage our energy supply and are given complete access to informa-
tion about how we live’, and that smart meters will lead to a ‘honeypot of data which 
energy insurance and marketing companies will inevitably be hungry for’.
Families in turmoil. This vision relates to smart meters adding stress or tension to family 
routines, or worse, breaking families apart. It is grounded in personal anecdotes from 
householders and studies about changes in family routines once energy feedback tech-
nologies were installed in the home. One of the family members, usually the father, 
would become an energy consumption detective, controlling the other family members’ 
energy routines, for instance, switching off a light in an empty room. One writer men-
tioned how smart meters provoked their seven-year-old daughter to shout ‘you’re 
destroying the planet, Daddy’ as he boiled a kettle and used the tumble dryer. Other 
sources indicated that smart meters enabled partners to ‘become the amusing nag around 
the house’ or turn ‘children into a kind of eco-police force’.
Nuclear power
Our data on nuclear power resulted in five distinct visions: (20) economic prosperity, (21) 
advanced nuclear skills, (22) weapons that end the world, (23) nuclear seagulls and kids, 
and (24) financial maelstrom. Four of the visions directly relate to the commercialization 
of nuclear energy, while the focus on the fear of nuclear weapons largely ignores the fact 
that a country can embrace commercial nuclear power while rejecting nuclear weapons or, 
alternately, develop nuclear weapons without embracing commercial nuclear power.
Economic prosperity. This vision promotes idea that nuclear energy could provide eco-
nomic prosperity throughout the United Kingdom in what one respondent referred to as 
‘under-invested parts of the country’. This financial benefit took several forms, including 
direct employment at the facility itself and spin-off employment for members of the local 
community who benefit from increasing (and increasingly affluent) local populations. In 
this way, the construction and operation of nuclear facilities was seen to directly enable 
access to more jobs and, in so doing, boost economic prosperity. Indeed, one interviewee 
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went as far as saying: ‘these communities want a nuclear power station, they know this 
is their lifeline in terms of economic growth and sustaining the economy’.
Advanced nuclear skills. This vision suggests that the development and operation of 
nuclear stations was seen to enable the education of the next generation of nuclear experts 
both in the local area and further afield. This occurred through specialist training and 
apprenticeship opportunities that enabled life-long jobs. Given that the facilities in ques-
tion (Hinkley Point in Somerset and Sellafield in Cumbria) were located in somewhat 
deprived local areas, this was seen as a lifeline for local residents: ‘there’s an apprentice 
scheme that they can go on rather than going to work on the land like people would have 
done 30 or 40 years ago, so they see that as an opportunity’.
Weapons that end the world. This vision cautions strongly against the production of 
nuclear energy and subsequent handling of nuclear waste, because it engendered visions 
of military linkages (both at home and abroad), militarization and nuclear weapons. It 
includes fears over facilities both exploding like bombs themselves and providing oppor-
tunities for them, muddying the waters between energy and war. Referencing the history 
of the Sellafield Nuclear Complex, for instance, an interviewee stated that it was seen ‘as 
both a huge technical hope and a quasi-military establishment, making the atoms for 
peace and atoms for war distinction quite problematic’. This notion was also linked to the 
idea of proliferation and military threat: ‘[I]t is the ultimate threat, is it not? It is the ulti-
mate weapon, it is a thing you can threaten your neighbor with in a way that no other 
weapon can.’
Nuclear seagulls and kids. This vision touches upon the fear inherent in radiation and 
nuclear accident through nuclear seagulls and nuclear kids. It stems from both recorded 
cases of negligence as well as the potential for future accidents. Indeed, commenting on 
poor maintenance levels, the vision talks about how nuclear energy is ‘absolutely hor-
rifying’ with ‘open-air ponds, which have nuclear waste in them’ being home to sea-
gulls. The vision notes how human health can be affected in a potentially deadly way as 
well, noting that ‘we are messing around with things and making things that have the 
potential to mess with the DNA of everything. I fail to see how we are ever going to 
contain it and stop it from doing that’. The vision also underscores a loss of trust in 
some nuclear operators.
Financial maelstrom. This vision rests on the idea that nuclear energy is incredibly expen-
sive both because of the costs associated with its construction and megawatt strike price, 
and because of the long-term nuclear waste legacy. Fears emerged that this prohibitive 
expense – much of which comes from subsidizing the energy form’s competitiveness – 
would be passed on to the ‘public purse’ and that UK residents would be paying for ‘the 
most expensive electricity in the world’. The vision discusses how ‘a substantial amount 
of overpayment for the contract and that is going to result in loading more costs into UK 
energy bills’ and that ‘we are spending billions every year on trying to deal with it, and I 
don’t think we are getting very far’.
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Shale gas
Our material led to the identification of five visions for shale gas in Eastern Europe: (25) 
empowerment of economic opportunity, (26) enhancer of energy security, (27) driver of 
decarbonization, (28) environmental blight and (29) energy authoritarianism and exploi-
tation. Two central discursive struggles emerge, one based on the competing visions of 
environmental implications, and one featuring different economic visions. A third point 
concerns whether the contrast between enhancing national security through independ-
ence comes at the risk of marginalization of local communities.
Empowerment of economic opportunity. This vision embraces shale gas as a source of 
economic welfare and job creation, of revenues for national or local budgets, and on the 
competitiveness of the manufacturing industry that constitute the core of this frame. As 
our source material indicated, shale gas could make Eastern European citizens ‘soon be 
living like in Kuwait’ and could ‘lead to decreasing [energy] prices and higher stability’ 
for the economy. Shale gas development therefore promises ‘plenty of benefits for eco-
nomic development, … not only to the oil and gas sector, but the overall industry of the 
country’, ‘especially for the state and local budgets’.
Enhancer of energy security. This vision comes against the backdrop of Eastern Europe’s 
historical experience of being geographically located between major regional powers, Rus-
sia and Germany, and the geopolitical fallout of their rivalry or alliances, notably during the 
period preceding the Second World War. It is equally informed by Eastern Europe’s experi-
ence as a group of satellite states of the Soviet Union for much of the postwar period. Reli-
able energy supply, notably with a view to reducing dependence on Russian gas imports, 
therefore forms an integral part of this vision, most prominently in Poland. Respondents 
note that energy is a ‘foreign policy tool for Russia [and] shale gas opens up the possibility 
of being more secure from Russia's monopolistic position.’ This vision supposes the 
advancement of ‘independence in the energy sector’ and of ‘long term security of supply’. 
Shale gas therefore fosters ‘diversification of primary energy sources’ which is deemed ‘of 
utmost importance’. Other material focused on promoting shale gas for regional ‘sover-
eignty’ and underlining ‘shale gas is not only an industry, it’s geopolitics’.
Driver of decarbonization. This vision sees unconventional gas as an opportunity to decar-
bonize Eastern European economies. The broader context here is a coal-intensive heat 
and power sector in the region, for which natural gas may offer a less CO2-heavy energy 
source (European Commission, 2011). Natural gas is also viewed as helpful in balancing 
intermittency problems when enhancing renewable electricity generation (Holz et al., 
2013; Neumann and von Hirschhausen, 2015). Against this backdrop, the vision suggests 
that ‘shale gas [on the basis of] best available technologies could be a transition fuel that 
could complement the use of renewables’. It depicts shale gas as a ‘bridging fuel for 
renewables’, a position supported by environmental groups adopting a ‘pragmatic under-
standing’ of (shale) gas as a way to mitigate emissions within national economies. Others 
talk about shale gas in the context of more stringent EU climate policies and the viability 
of it helping Eastern Europe if carbon pricing regimes are established.
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Environmental blight. This vision sees shale gas as a stain on the environment and a threat 
to ecosystem services that intertwine with agriculture and economic sustainability. This 
vision was especially prominent in Bulgaria but resonated across the region, referring to 
the importance of aquifers for crop production and serving the population with drinking 
water. The vision includes recognition that potential pollution caused by shale gas extrac-
tion therefore entails the risk of depriving parts of the Bulgarian society of their eco-
nomic base, particularly concerning groundwater safety and food security. Other themes 
within the vision include things like methane leakage, the global warming potential of 
natural gas, and the sub-optimality of shale gas compared to other decarbonization 
options such as energy efficiency or renewable sources of energy.
Energy authoritarianism and exploitation. This vision labels shale gas as an attempt to 
exploit domestic resources for private gains. In this vision, foreign energy companies, 
rather than being perceived as engines of growth and sources of investment, are por-
trayed as the cause of unsustainable economic activity: ‘they do not create jobs for the 
local population [only for] foreign experts’. The vision also suggests that shale gas brings 
‘no gains for the local population, only damages and problems’ and ‘when things start to 
collapse, companies just give up, but environmental problems remain’. A related theme 
within this vision suggests that shale gas promotes energy authoritarianism because a 
lack of transparency erodes democratic and participatory governance. This aspect of the 
vision focuses on how the public have lacked ‘sufficient information’ about associated 
risks, how ‘concessions were granted without public discussion, and an alleged ‘secrecy’ 
and ‘haste’ pertaining to related policy decisions, fostering distrust. This distrust comes 
against the backdrop of negative experiences with extractive industries companies being 
accused of corruption and human rights abuses.
Hydrogen
We see five hydrogen visions arising from our material as well: (30) patriotic energy 
independence, (31) the ubiquitous and clean hydrogen economy, (32) energy democrati-
zation, (33) climatic disaster, and (34) costly mistake. Struggles over these visions relate 
to whether they promote decentralization and disrupt energy markets, or further consoli-
dation and corporate control.
Patriotic energy independence. Under this vision, clean, hydrogen powered automobiles 
and power stations are seen as a way to minimize and even eliminate costly dependence 
on foreign sources of fuel, all the while contributing to economic growth. Hydrogen 
improves security of supply, minimizes dependence on imports, and improves diversifi-
cation. In this future world, ‘Environmental pollution will no longer be a concern. Every 
nation will have all the energy it needs available within its borders. Personal transporta-
tion will be cheaper to operate and easier to maintain. Economic, financial and intellec-
tual resources devoted today to acquiring adequate energy resources and to handling 
environmental issues will be turned to other productive tasks for the benefit of the peo-
ple. Life will get better.’ By minimizing and eventually displacing imports of foreign 
fuels, the hydrogen economy is envisioned as an important tool to reduce national 
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deficits, insulate economies for fuel shocks, and improve economic vitality. At the 
extreme, hydrogen ‘can satisfy all the needs of human kind and form an energy system 
that would be permanent and independent of energy sources’. It can be blended with 
undertones of patriotism as well, given that ‘energy independence through hydrogen is a 
patriotic duty’.
The ubiquitous and clean hydrogen economy. This vision of a future where hydrogen is 
ubiquitous is depicted as an extrapolation of current trends, because shortages in the sup-
ply of conventional fossil fuels will force it, or because hydrogen ‘is the indispensable 
Kyoto compatible, clean and abundant energy carrier’. Sources articulate that ‘the domi-
nant role of hydrogen in a sustainable energy future is widely accepted’ and that hydro-
gen ‘will come to the fore within the first half of the twenty-first century’. It is envisioned 
that hydrogen is instrumental to maintaining current levels of consumption and eco-
nomic growth in the industrialized and industrializing world. Hydrogen is the ‘forever 
fuel’ or ‘dream fuel’ because it never runs out, and when used to produce power the only 
byproducts ‘are pure water and heat’. We are told that hydrogen ‘automatically solves, in 
principle, the global problem of the greenhouse effect’, that it is ‘the ultimate step in 
climate stabilization’, that it will ‘contribute to the reduction of energy-linked environ-
mental impacts, including global warming’, and that it ‘could be crucial to the future of 
mankind and the planet it ever-more-tenuously occupies’.
Energy democratization. This vision describes the hydrogen economy as a path towards 
community empowerment and democratization. This theme envisions hydrogen as pro-
moting more pluralistic, participatory, and community-owned forms of energy produc-
tion. Some proponents even go so far as to frame the hydrogen economy as a fundamental 
altering of ecological values, changing the way that humanity conceptualizes its relation-
ship with energy technologies and the environment. A more moderate version of this 
theme shifts from arguing that hydrogen empowers people to a more nuanced debate 
over the merits of decentralized energy supply. To proponents of this vision, the key to 
replacing the current energy infrastructure is decentralization, or more particularly the 
advent of the ‘energy internet’ or the ‘Worldwide Energy Web’. Taken to its logical 
extreme, this decentralization of energy production transforms society. It will ‘make pos-
sible a vast redistribution of power’ eliminating the ‘centralized, top-down flow of 
energy, controlled by global oil companies and utilities’. The result is peer-to-peer energy 
sharing, analogous to file sharing on the internet, forcing energy companies to cooperate 
‘or follow the evolutionary path of the dinosaurs’.
Climatic disaster. This negative vision suggests that using hydrogen as an energy carrier 
creates fundamental problems unavoidable by the laws of physics and thermodynamics. 
Hydrogen is a source of energy only if it can be taken in its pure form and reacted with 
another chemical, such as oxygen. Natural forces have already oxidized all the hydrogen 
on earth, with the exception of hydrocarbons, so that none of it is available as usable fuel. 
The rest has to be ‘made’. Oil refineries use hydrogen to purify fuels, and chemical 
manufacturers employ it to make ammonia and other compounds. Both industries obtain 
a vast majority of their hydrogen from high-temperature processing of natural gas and 
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petroleum. The method, however, is inefficient, energy-intensive and highly polluting. 
The vision highlights the inefficiency of using natural gas as a transitional fuel to make 
hydrogen, and it warns that we should not base policy on unproven technologies, such as 
the desire to unlock the ‘mysteries that Nature has long kept hidden’.
Costly mistake. This negative vision states that pathways for making hydrogen are excep-
tionally expensive, and would need to see existing costs for energy and electricity rise 
significantly in order to be competitive. Large, capital-intensive hydrogen infrastructure 
would have to be erected, including long-distance pipelines and storage facilities. Hydro-
gen pipelines would also rely on large amounts of energy to move the gas along the line. 
Storing hydrogen in its gaseous state requires large, high-pressure cylinders, requiring 
significant storage space. The vision also questions the safety attributes of hydrogen, 
given that it is flammable at a much wider range of concentrations than natural gas, and 
hydrogen flames are barely visible. Even under a best-case scenario in which researchers 
throw an unlimited amount of money into hydrogen research, the vision warns that com-
mercialization would not likely occur until after 2035. This means hydrogen ‘won’t pro-
vide cheap and abundant energy’ and that it is a ‘dismal excuse for comprehensive energy 
solutions’.
Fossil fuel divestment
Lastly, four visions of fossil fuel divestment were apparent: (35) the climatic imperative, 
(36) the carbon bubble, (37) democratic transformation, and (38) fiduciary duty. These 
visions are particularly interesting because they reflect the ways in which cues resonate 
with informed audiences. The climatic imperative is similar to other visions in this analy-
sis; the arguments invoke a dystopian future, but the narratives can resonate with a larger 
range of people. The other three visions assume a more technically skilled or informed 
audience, turning carbon reserves into investor exposure, arguing for the democratic 
value of divestment, and exploring the role of fiduciary duty. These cues assuredly reso-
nate with investment personnel and business executives.
Climatic imperative. This vision asserts that global warming could cause devastating 
damage to the environment and society, and that limiting global warming to 2°C requires 
that the majority of known fossil fuel reserves must be left in the ground. This is a moral 
argument, seeing averting such damage as a higher imperative than economic gain. Peo-
ple articulating this vision talk about ‘doing something’ about climate change, making 
statements such as ‘you shouldn't be profiting from wrecking the planet from causing 
worse climate change’ and ‘if you were to extract all of the existing reserves that we have 
over the world, then that would be enough to cause catastrophic climate change’.
Carbon bubble. This vision focuses on the economic risk posed by overvaluing fossil fuel 
assets and companies that produce fossil fuels, and how the correction of the ‘carbon 
bubble’ could have severe implications. Again, research indicates that limiting global 
warming to 2°C requires that the majority of known of fossil fuel reserves must be left in 
the ground, potentially leaving reserves and infrastructure as ‘stranded assets’, the fuels 
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‘unburnable’ within the carbon budget. In this vision, ‘you have people investing in fossil 
fuel companies because of the high dividend, but once the dividend stops, you’re going 
to see a huge amount of [capital] exiting of that market’ and ‘if companies are not prepar-
ing themselves for a fossil-free world, they're exposing themselves to serious issues 
when it comes to the future’. Another statement suggested that ‘we’re talking about a 
systemic existential crisis that’s portfolio-wide and now quite urgent’. There is a sense of 
inevitability of change in this narrative. Some corporations and groups that divest or 
reduce fossil fuels in their portfolios cite narrow economic grounds, acknowledging nei-
ther ethical nor environmental justifications, nor giving any credit to activists.
Democratic transformation. This vision iterates some of the political and justice themes in 
divestment, and how the act of divestment purges and transforms a political system of the 
corruption and lobbying power of fossil fuels. It depicts the goal of divestment as reducing 
the power of fossil fuel companies and their financers over the political system, and taking 
away their social license to operate. Material representing this vision suggested that ‘you’re 
creating a legitimacy crisis, if you like, for fossil fuel backers and industries’ and that 
divestment ‘strips fossil fuel companies, the very companies we identify as being the driv-
ers and profiteers of the climate crisis, really strips them of their social license to operate’. 
These companies need to be ‘called out’ and ‘delegitimized’. In this vision, the fossil fuel 
industry is the villain, the finance system is its enabler: ‘fossil fuel companies have been 
deliberately misleading and slowing down progress on climate change’ and ‘the fossil fuel 
industry is a highly dysfunctional, sociopathic influence on politics and the regulatory sys-
tem’. The financial sector is ‘the primary enabler of dysfunctional corporate and market 
behavior’. Divestment is a heroic act of discrediting the industry and issuing a call to arms.
Fiduciary duty. This vision opposes divestment based on the obligation of fund managers 
to act in the best interest of investors and shareholders, often narrowly interpreted as 
maximizing (short-term) returns on investment. The argument goes that as long as fossil 
fuels offer the best returns on investment, fund managers cannot legally divest from 
them, even when that means ignoring the threat of climate change. It is captured in state-
ments such as: ‘we have a fiduciary duty to make a maximum return on our investment’, 
‘if they want a good dividend yield, that is what they get from oil and gas companies at 
the moment’, and ‘trustees have to concentrate on their fiduciary responsibility, primar-
ily’. It suggests there are no alternatives to fossil fuels in terms of safe, profitable invest-
ment and highlights that fossil fuels are currently still necessary. It tends to frame 
campaigners as not understanding the world of finance, nor appreciating the need for 
fossil fuels. It notes that there is hardly any fund ‘which looks like a normal stock market 
fund for charities which has no fossil fuel extraction and refinement activities in it’.
Rhetorical features: Problems, storylines and discursive 
struggles
Unveiling 38 visions across seven innovations is an arduous task, and we believe there is 
novelty in simply identifying such rhetorical diversity (with, again, a full list offered in 
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Table A1 in the Supplementary Material). However, in this section, we critically and 
comparatively analyze all visions according to the problems they attempt to address, 
common storylines and characters, and discursive struggles and contestations.
Problems, functions and ideographs
At their core, many visions are addressing some sort of problem – therefore possess-
ing a functional utility rather than merely a symbolic one. This confirms earlier 
research suggesting that visions and fantasies are often functional and instrumental, 
or even utopian, because they fulfill some perceived social need, enabling propo-
nents to capture resources (Geels and Smit, 2000). For example, the development of 
hydrogen may play a role in the creation of social communities, reflecting a desire 
for empowerment and democratization under conditions of decentralism and local-
ism. This discursive relationship between problem and solution can serve to broker 
relationships between relevant social groups and create a dynamic of ‘promise and 
requirement’ where actors make promissory commitments to the technology, forging 
a shared agenda that requires action. In this way, the functionality of the vision 
results in a ‘mandate’ to developers and advocates, what Borup et al. (2006: 290) call 
‘the freedom to explore and develop combined with a societal obligation to deliver 
in the end’.
When looking at solutions (or non-solutions, on some visions) to problems, the 
visions are fairly vague, which likely enhances their rhetorical appeal. As a result, the 
problem being addressed can become a symbolic cue. To the extent that the cues resonate 
with audiences, individuals can fill those gaps according to their interpretations of the 
visions. The dynamism between specific problems and solutions implies a ‘rhetorical 
selectivity’ (Peterson, 1997: 12) that obscures meaningful barriers or problems with a 
low-carbon innovation (Sovacool and Ramana, 2015). For example, electric vehicles are 
portrayed as a technical solution to the narrowly defined problem of carbon emissions in 
a way that overlooks all other problems caused by automobility (except perhaps local air 
pollution); this vision relies on defining sustainability as an emissions problem only, 
obscuring the challenge of decarbonizing a grid needing the additional capacity to charge 
EVs. Thus, new technologies become evaluated primarily as solutions to existing prob-
lems (as defined by the technology’s advocates).
We see similar dimensions, cues, functions, problems and ideographs across the 38 
visions depicted earlier. As Table 3 indicates, some visions center on technological or 
scientific problems or ideographs such as progress, innovation, scientific exploration or 
technical development. Some center on socio-economic dimensions such as poverty, 
jobs, and growth. Some focus on environmental concerns such as sustainability, futurity, 
stewardship or energy efficiency. Some involve security in various forms – national 
security, human security, safety, individual privacy, and terrorism. Some relate to politics 
– liberty, democracy, empowerment, decentralization and independence become known. 
Indeed, in some (electric vehicles, smart meters), there is even a shifting of responsibility 
from the technology and its manufacturers to users, framing uptake – and consumers – as 
a problem.
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Storylines, characters and plots
Although less explicit and detailed, our visions differ in terms of their stories and nar-
ratives, plotlines, agency and characters. Sometimes, agents play active and conscious 
roles; at other times, they play passive or even subconscious/unknowing roles. Some 
may be essential to securing a particular type of future, acting as a ‘star’ or ‘lead actor’; 
others may be important but not critical (acting as ‘extras’ or ‘costars’) (Brown et al., 
2000). Others may touch upon themes such as heroism or horror (Janda and Topouzi, 
2015).
Propp (1968) offers a useful framework for analyzing the plots of stories, building on 
an analysis of Russian folktales. All of the folktales Propp examined have common 
themes such as morphemes (analyzable pieces) and narratemes (narrative units). He 
identifies five common elements across those stories:
•• predatory functions of the donor (the term Propp uses), or common functions of 
the dramatis personae (the characters), such as being unmarried, going to war, 
striking it rich, and so on;
•• conjunctive elements, or common rhetorical techniques to amplify the message, 
such as characters raising their voice or the sudden announcement of misfortune 
to enhance drama;
•• motivations, or the reasoning, goals, aims, and strategies of the characters;
•• forms of appearance, or how the characters entered and exited (e.g., flying on the 
back of a dragon, or arriving unexpectedly by chance);
•• attributive elements, or material artifacts and accessories that move the plot along 
(e.g., a weapon, a cave, a witches’ hut, a castle).
Given that most of our low-carbon visions were relatively short and technical, they do 
not fully meet Propp’s framework or contain all of these elements. However, our visions 
do conform to two of Propp’s findings. Our visions are paired, they almost always have 
the presence of good versus evil in the form of heroes (kings, soldiers, unmarried bach-
elors, and eagles for Propp) pitted against villains (a dragon, a devil, bandits, a witch, or 
a stepmother for Propp). And our visions are full of attributive elements, especially mate-
rial technologies and socio-technical systems, which can influence the trajectory of the 
story in active and passive ways.
Numerous types of actors and agents come up throughout our visions, fitting the 
typology of pairing (heroes and villains) and attributive elements (passive vs. active) 
described by Propp (1968) (see Figure 1). Within our material, these included:
•• the product or artifact: the technology or sociotechnical system with limitless 
potential;
•• the happy user or consumer: the likely or intended adopter of the particular tech-
nology or service (or conversely the reluctant, anxious, or irrational consumer that 
rejects the innovation);
•• the ally or intermediary: the critical stakeholder or champion whose support is 
needed for the innovation or technology to succeed;
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•• the prime adversary: the single person, stakeholder group, institution, or policy 
regime that must be overcome or eliminated;
•• the daunting challenge: the massive degree of social or technical transformation 
needed to ensure the vision occurs;
•• the evil villain: the malicious and deceptive provocateur set to destroy the world 
who must be stopped at all costs;
•• the inhuman opponent: faceless threats such as climate change, poverty, or human 
insecurity that must be thwarted.
Almost every vision is paired, it can be tied in some way to a villain or adversary. Under 
the theme of progress (for automated vehicles, electric vehicles, and hydrogen in particu-
lar) are those who, often through ignorance and self-centeredness, doubt the legitimacy 
of a foregone and beneficial energy transition. The villains in the themes of independ-
ence or autarky (smart meters, hydrogen, divestment) are fossil fuel companies and 
financial actors who support them, oil suppliers, energy companies and cartels such as 
OPEC that desire to raise energy prices or invest in fossil fuels. Moreover, in some 
instances, visions involve more specific actors such as hackers and terrorists behind a 
vulnerable grid (smart meters), or the corporate stewards adhering to notions of fiduciary 
duty (divestment). The villains, adversaries and challenges even become conflated in the 
themes of effortless freight (automated vehicles), the electric society (electric vehicles), 
future smart innovation (smart meters), patriotic energy independence (hydrogen), or the 
ubiquitous and clean hydrogen economy (hydrogen) – those that seek to waste energy, 
subvert innovation, and/or and select inefficient technologies. More generally, environ-
mentalists across almost all of the visions see big industrial emitters of greenhouse gases 
Figure 1. Heroes, villains, beneficiaries, and victims in low-carbon visions.
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as culprits threatening the vitality of the climate, whereas industrial stakeholders may see 
environmentalists as villains seeking to constrain growth and place limits on 
industrialization.
Some visions center on inhuman opponents such as climate change, degraded habi-
tats, or disruptions to ecosystem services (or passive victims such as the climate or envi-
ronment). These visions include the decarbonized grid (electric vehicles), the low-carbon 
grid (smart meters), nuclear seagulls and kids (nuclear power), driver of decarbonization 
(shale gas), environmental blight (shale gas), the ubiquitous and clean hydrogen econ-
omy (hydrogen), climatic disaster (hydrogen), and climatic imperative (divestment). 
Other visions revolve around institutions, politicians, energy conglomerates, and other 
firms as the main adversaries, such as empowered consumers (smart meters), energy 
authoritarianism and exploitation (shale gas), patriotic energy independence (hydrogen), 
energy democratization (hydrogen), and democratic transformation (divestment).
Many visions have passive agents or passive beneficiaries. These are people or groups 
that are either ignored or presumed to play their part in a simplistic way. For example, 
electric vehicle visions tend to portray users/consumers as passive actors, whose sole 
role in the transition is to buy a different type of vehicle, rather than act as partners, 
agents of change, or knowledge providers; behavior change beyond vehicle choice is 
mostly ignored.
The resonance of these stories, characters, villains and challenges reminds us that 
the publics and audiences subscribing to a particular vision will develop or reuse code 
words, phrases, slogans and themes. To give just a few examples, we see ‘robots’ 
repeatedly mentioned in visions of automated automobility, ‘Big Brother’ and ‘spies’ 
mentioned frequently in smart meter visions, and shale gas constantly heralded as a 
‘bridge’ to a low-carbon future. These cues can trigger previously shared fantasies, 
may refer to a geographical or imaginary place or the name of a persona, and they may 
arouse a range of other emotions. This act of cuing a narrative enables groups of people 
to come to a cognitive convergence about that part of their common experience. These 
visions can advance discussions at pragmatic levels, but once cataclysmic depictions 
of problems are articulated, the narrative forms tend to lead advocates to advance uto-
pian fantasies for solutions or dystopian fantasies to visualize causes. The fluidity of 
problems, functions, and ideographs serves as a reminder that each of the visions asso-
ciated with particular energy systems may be aimed at particular audiences or publics. 
Bryant (1953) notes that rhetoric performs ‘the function of adjusting ideas to people 
and of people to ideas’. Put simply, effective advocates manipulate their messages to 
resonate with their audiences, but they also use messages to help move audiences to be 
receptive to ideas.
Discursive struggles and contestations
Each of our visions contains internal discursive struggles or contestations. For visions 
about automated vehicles, uncertainty remains over the extent that automation will 
facilitate (or destroy) jobs and skills, as well as over whether they will transform or 
simply reinforce traditional forms of mobility. Similar contestations arise over whether 
electric vehicles will condone or challenge conventional forms of automobility, as well 
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as whether they will require behavioral adjustment (adapting the consumer to the car) 
or further innovation (adapting the car to consumer needs). Smart meters exhibit strug-
gles over where the financial and carbon savings accrue (among consumers, suppliers, 
or society as a whole?) and to the extent that consumer data is protected or merely sold 
to interested companies and government agencies. Nuclear visions are contested over 
the timing and extent of projected costs and benefits as well as where (geographically) 
external costs are distributed. Shale gas visions contest whether it will complement 
incumbent energy providers or disrupt them, as well as whether it is a bridge to a low-
carbon energy system or a costly detour. Hydrogen visions also contest whether it will 
empower communities to challenge the dominance of conventional energy companies 
or merely reinforce their innovativeness and competitiveness, as well as its cleanliness 
in terms of how hydrogen is manufactured. Visions about divestment remain contested 
over whether moral and environmental imperatives ought to outweigh financial ones, 
and whether the fossil fuel industry is a partner or a predator when it comes to a low-
carbon society. Furthermore, visions also take contested views over particular ideo-
graphs, with as one example some (electric vehicles) seeing safety as inherently not 
disrupting the system, whereas others (divestment, hydrogen) see disruption as key to 
a safer future.
Thus, despite their utopian undertones as solving compelling problems, the imagined 
futures across our sample are also contested and contradictory. In such cases, contradic-
tions can be strategic. As Berkout (2006: 305) suggests, ‘a degree of flexibility over the 
interpretation of a vision can widen its relevance to greater numbers of actors’. Some 
contradiction can relate to the manufactured ambiguity or flexibility of most fantasies: 
They need to be broad enough to enroll actors but vague enough to withstand criticism. 
In other cases, such contradictions can reflect internal denial and cognitive dissonance 
among articulators of the vision or its audience. When looking at the early history of 
innovations such as electricity, x-rays and the telegraph, Simon (2005) suggests that the 
introduction of any potentially transforming technology creates a tension between desir-
able changes in day-to-day life and the anxiety that follows any step into the unknown. 
For example, automated vehicles reflect to some an appealing way of enhancing the 
knowledge and skills base of human drivers (comforting), yet to others they offer a 
mechanisms by which human drivers may be entirely redundant and thus locked out of 
millions of jobs (increasing anxiety).
More broadly, some visions promote low-carbon innovation on the grounds that it 
would radically reorient society to hold more ecologically sustainable values – essen-
tially transforming the energy system – whereas others promote visions that enable us 
to continue business as usual, preserving and extending the energy system. We will even 
return to this point below when discussing the incremental versus radical nature of the 
38 visions. As Tenner (2006: 64) writes, however, this tension reflects a deeper social 
dilemma: ‘the choice is between a material and artistic culture that reflects and even 
anticipates change and one that cushions the spiritual shocks of change.’ Marshall 
(2016) adds that some visions and fantasies act as psycho-social defense mechanisms, 
intended to assuage political discomfort or social anxiety. Here, the contradictory nature 
of a vision is not a weakness or an unintended byproduct, but its intended strength or 
purpose.
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Rhetorical effectiveness and resolution
A final implication of this analysis features the rhetorical implications of the competing 
visions or their discursive struggles, and, in doing so, identifies routes advocates can 
consider to enhance their persuasive appeals. The discussion of divestment provides a 
valuable example. It is difficult to imagine that someone would prioritize short term 
economic gain over substantial and realistic degradation of the planet. What then, are the 
obstacles to achieving the solution advanced in the vision? Part of it is still convincing 
some people that the threats of anthropomorphic climate change are real, and part may 
be to convince others that we can do something about it. However, a persuasive argument 
that may work is to target current laws concerning the fiduciary duty of companies to 
maximize profits for investors. Striking such laws seems implausible, yet modifying 
them to exclude practices that actively harm the planet may be possible. The specifics of 
such a proposal are well beyond the scope of this paper, but an important element this 
analysis can provide is revealing the most important conflicts in visions, thus setting up 
calls to look for new arguments that tackle particular discursive struggles which arise 
from the existing conflicting visions.
Similarly, rather than feature a need for ‘more education’ about the benefits of EVs 
as a response to the reluctant and anxious consumer vision, this analysis might suggest 
that people are not always rationale, and that suggests contemplating different persua-
sive strategies. For example, extending ranges, identifying adoption with national or 
planetary goals, or finding collaborative approaches so that individuals do not feel that 
they are making significant personal sacrifices while achieving little for the planet 
since relatively few of their peers are buying EVs, could all provide alternatives to 
efforts to provide more education. In any of these competing visions, finding the points 
of contestation is a significant contribution that can provide an initial step toward find-
ing resolutions.
Typologies: Valence, temporality and radicalism
Visions differ not only in their rhetorical features; they vary meaningfully in dichotomies 
or typologies in terms of the valence (utopian vs. dystopian), temporality (proximal vs. 
distant), and radicalism (incremental vs. transformative).
Valence (utopian vs. dystopian)
One fundamental way visions differ – already alluded to in the discussion of problems, 
functions, and ideographs – is their valence. Some visions are utopian, and tied to posi-
tive emotions such as hope, excitement, happiness, and even love. Others are dystopian, 
and tied to negative emotions such as fear, despair, boredom, and even hatred.
For example, some of our visions frame low-carbon innovation as a harbinger of a 
utopian democratic social order (hydrogen), a nirvana for technical innovation and busi-
ness development (smart meters), a platform for automobility ubiquity (automated 
mobility, electric vehicles), or a pathway towards environmental sustainability and 
decarbonization (shale gas, fossil fuel divestment, others) (see Table 4). These starkly 
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contrast with negative visions of radiation, fear and death (nuclear power), businesses 
declaring bankruptcy (fossil fuel divestment), terrorists and hackers launching new 
sophisticated attacks on grids (smart meters), and consumers held hostage to the whims 
of unsentimental corporate firms (shale gas).
Furthermore, some visions directly refute or challenge each other. For automated 
vehicles, the vision of the educated trucker is the opposite of one of mass unemploy-
ment. For electric vehicles, all of the positive visions would be negated by a techno-
logical disappointment; for smart meters, future smart innovation is literally offset by 
a costly disaster. For nuclear power, economic prosperity is the antithesis of financial 
maelstrom, and weapons to end the world would trump anything positive at all arising 
from advanced nuclear skills (and, arguably, anything else for that matter). For shale 
gas, environmental blight is the literal opposite of the driver of decarbonization vision, 
the gains from economic opportunity are offset by energy authoritarianism. For hydro-
gen, the theme of energy democracy sees communities taking back control over pro-
duction and use, whereas a theme of patriotism instead sees control shifted to companies 
and national economic competitiveness enhanced. For divestment, a climatic impera-
tive could come at the massive expense of a carbon bubble crippling economies. This 
tension in valence suggests a dynamic dialectic in that the positive visions are often 
defined only in relation to the negative ones (they avoid them), and vice versa. In other 
cases, tensions in valence can be a way of furthering the plot – of enhancing the per-
formative effect of a vision’s climax, resolution, or failure to reach a resolution (Deuten 
and Rip, 2000).
Table 4. Utopian and dystopian valence of 38 low-carbon visions.
Innovation Visions
Positive and utopian Negative and dystopian
Automated 
vehicles
Effortless freight, the educated 
trucker, transformers
Entrenched automobility, a perilous 




Entrenched automobility, the 
electric society, the decarbonized 
grid, a revitalized economy




Empowered consumers, the low-
carbon grid, future smart innovation
Costly disaster, hacked and 
vulnerable grid, families in turmoil
Nuclear 
power
Economic prosperity, advanced 
nuclear skills
Weapons that end the world, nuclear 
seagulls and kids, financial maelstrom
Shale gas Empowerment of economic 
opportunity, enhancer of energy 
security, driver of decarbonization
Environmental blight, energy 
authoritarianism and exploitation
Hydrogen Patriotic energy independence, 
the ubiquitous and clean hydrogen 
economy, energy democratization
Climatic disaster, costly mistake
Fossil fuel 
divestment
Climatic imperative, democratic 
transformation
Fiduciary duty, the carbon bubble
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Temporality (proximal vs. distant)
Visions can differ in their temporality, some are proximal (depicted to occur within a few 
weeks to a few years’ time) whereas others are distant (far into the future, often a decade 
or even a century away).
Recognizing that many visions fall into more intermediate areas between proximal and 
distant, Table 5 sketches of the temporal dimensions of the 38 visions. Automated vehicles 
could bring improvements in efficiency and effort and skills development or costly infra-
structural investments within the coming decade, whereas other visions such as trans-
formers or mass unemployment would be more distant. EVs, by contrast, could entrench 
automobility or be hobbled by anxious adopters in the near term, or decarbonize grids and 
revitalize the UK economy in the long-term. Smart meters can empower consumers or 
lead to hacked grids now, whereas smart innovation and truly low-carbon grids come 
later. For nuclear power, one must suffer the risk of weapons that end the world and 
nuclear seagulls and kids to achieve the more distant prosperously revitalized economy or 
enduring nuclear skills. Shale gas sees environmental impacts and local economic effects 
occur in the near-term, but potential impacts on energy security or the carbon intensity of 
whole economies in the longer-term. Similarly, hydrogen’s risk of exacerbating climate 
change or sinking investment in the wrong pathway come before one could ever hope to 
Table 5. Proximal and distant temporality of 38 low-carbon visions.
Innovation Visions
Proximal  
(within the next decade)
Distant  
(within at least a decade)
Automated 
vehicles
Effortless freight, the educated 
trucker, a perilous distraction
Entrenched automobility, 
Transformers, mass unemployment, 
infrastructural overhaul
Electric vehicles Entrenched automobility, the 
reluctant and anxious consumer
The electric society, the decarbonized 
grid, a revitalized economy, 
technological disappointment
Smart meters Empowered consumers, 
families in turmoil, hacked and 
vulnerable grid
Future smart innovation, low-carbon 
grid, costly disaster
Nuclear power Weapons that end the world, 
nuclear seagulls and kids
Economic prosperity, advanced nuclear 
skills, financial maelstrom




Enhancer of environmental security, 
driver of decarbonization
Hydrogen Climatic disaster, costly mistake Patriotic energy independence, 




Fiduciary duty, climatic 
imperative, the carbon bubble, 
democratic transformation
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achieve true energy independence, a hydrogen economy, or democratization. For fossil 
fuel divestment, all of the visions are proximal, given the urgency of tackling climate 
change, although their consequences and implications are for the more distant future.
An implicit element of visions with differing timescales and immediacy (or temporal 
remoteness) is that some benefits may be pitted against each other in temporal terms. As 
Brown et al. (2000: 4) write, future expectations ‘may run in parallel with and contest 
each other, occupying different time-frames and carrying different interests’. Some 
visions concern benefits and risks, such as economic development or water contamina-
tion, that occur now, while others, such as eventually halting climate change or transfor-
mations of social or economic structure, will occur well into the future. They also occur 
at different scales: things like employment, land, air and human health impacts tend to be 
localized, whereas progressive growth, the elimination of poverty or energy dependence, 
solving climate change, or cascading patterns of innovation are national or even interna-
tional. Such complexity plays a forceful role in making visions contested – something 
touched upon above – and it also implies that the particular array of costs and benefits 
will play out differently according to each vision but mediated by temporality and place. 
The future will likely hold even more diverse and divergent pathways than these.
Radicalism (incremental vs. transformative)
A final way visions meaningfully differ is in terms of whether the scope of sociotechnical 
change brought about by the vision is incremental, pragmatic or conventional, or instead 
radical, disruptive and transformative (Michael, 2000). Incremental visions essentially 
see the future as similar to the present, taking current fundamental or foundational condi-
tions as the basis of foresight. These visions may even seek to protect, extend or entrench 
business as usual. This contrasts with transformative visions that are more progressive, 
disruptive, substantive or ends-oriented, in which society may differ in fundamental 
ways from how it exists now.
We see such dynamics at play within our 38 visions, summarized in Table 6. Automated 
vehicles could either incrementally improve the efficiency of freight or the skillset of driv-
ers, or lead to the wholesale overhauling of transport infrastructure and rampant disruption 
of labor markets. EVs can either entrench or entirely reform mobility. Smart meters can 
either empower consumers or place them at the mercy of errant hackers and terrorists. 
Nuclear power can either enhance national prosperity or lead to the apocalypse of all 
nations. Shale gas can protect incumbent firms or lead to entire transformations of ecosys-
tems and climatic damage. Hydrogen can either lead to business as usual (freed from envi-
ronmental constraints) or revolutionize global energy and political systems. Divestment 
can similarly remind investors of the merits (and legal necessity) of pursuing business as 
usual or also see the entire collapse of national economies or (corrupt) political systems.
Conclusion
Our evidence revealed 38 visions and 14 ideographs circulating across a mere seven low-
carbon innovations dealing with mobility or energy. Based on this evidence, we advance 
five synthetic conclusions.
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First, many visions are contextually specific to the innovation being examined, such 
as the educated trucker (automated mobility), the reluctant and anxious consumer (elec-
tric vehicles), families in turmoil (smart meters), nuclear seagulls and kids (nuclear 
power), energy authoritarianism (shale gas), ubiquitous hydrogen economy (hydrogen), 
and the carbon bubble (fossil fuel divestment). Others seemed eerily similar to each other 
or are fairly generic across our innovations, such as entrenched automobility (electric 
vehicles, automated mobility), decarbonization (electric vehicles, smart meters, shale 
gas, divestment), democracy (hydrogen, divestment), and various visions of economic 
growth or stability (electric vehicles, nuclear power, shale gas).
Second, despite their varying specificity and generalizability, the 38 visions involve a 
diverse set of storylines and cues, addressing different problems across different dimen-
sions. A priori, we can imagine problems in: scientific, technological, social, cultural, 
economic, environmental, security, political, moral, epistemic, aesthetic, religious, 
health and logical dimensions. Obviously, some of these dimensions are more salient to 
future energy visions than others. Also, the popularity and recurrence of many visions 
across each innovation suggests that the broader low-carbon future remains an open-
ended idea, as well as one subject to mass appeal, capable of sustaining the public imagi-
nation. Within these visions, there do remain apparent ‘master narratives’ and ‘cues’ with 
broad consensus, reflected in high frequency counts. The most frequent visions were 
effortless freight (63% across our automated vehicles evidence), entrenched automobil-
ity (94% of electric vehicle evidence), empowered consumers (64% of smart meters), 
nuclear kids and seagulls (61% of nuclear power evidence), financial maelstrom (61% of 
nuclear power), economic empowerment for shale gas (49% of evidence), patriotic 
Table 6. Incremental and transformative dimensions of 38 low-carbon visions.
Innovation Visions
Incremental or protective Transformative or disruptive
Automated 
vehicles
Effortless freight, the educated 






Entrenched automobility, the 
reluctant and anxious consumer, 
technological disappointment
The electric society, the 
decarbonized grid, a revitalized 
economy
Smart meters Empowered consumers, costly 
disaster, families in turmoil
Future smart innovation, low-carbon 
grid, hacked and vulnerable grid
Nuclear power Economic prosperity, advanced 
nuclear skills
Weapons that end the world, nuclear 
seagulls and kids, financial maelstrom
Shale gas Empowerment of economic 
opportunity, enhancer of energy 
security, energy authoritarianism
Driver of decarbonization, 
environmental blight
Hydrogen Patriotic energy independence, 
climatic disaster, costly mistake




Fiduciary duty Climatic imperative, the carbon 
bubble, democratic transformation
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energy independence (65% of hydrogen), and the carbon bubble (92% of divestment 
material). In some cases, a single dominant vision could reflect a growing consensus 
among powerful incumbents over the most desirable future, such as the entrenched auto-
mobility vision. In contrast, there are areas where competing visions do not result in 
‘high’ frequency counts, which may suggest that competing visions are still contested, 
cues ineffective and fantasies unformed. In the various visions of automated trucking, 
the vision of effortless freight was very high (63%), but whether that was good for driv-
ers was not settled. The educated trucker vision was moderate (35%), while two negative 
visions had low representations. The perilous distraction vision was found in 12% of the 
material, and the mass unemployment vision was found in 18% of the material.
Third, and perhaps obviously, such visions are complex and dynamic. Low-carbon 
innovations are depicted in the narratives as capable of achieving things as diverse as 
eroding family values (smart meters), eliminating poverty (hydrogen), reasserting indi-
vidual or local autonomy (automated vehicles, electric vehicles, shale gas, nuclear 
power), or leading to the end of the world (nuclear power) or attacks akin to nuclear 
strikes (smart meters). Such visions weave together and develop stories that intersect 
energy production and consumption with diverse topics across domains and scales, and 
also rely on a variety of distinct symbolic cues. Yet others are about foreclosing options 
or ‘colonizing the future’ (Middleton, 2015) by closing down storylines: optimistic and 
inspirational visions can ignore or erase likely challenges; despondent and even apoca-
lyptic visions can discount potential advantages in their attempts to motivate people to 
reject and actively resist a dystopian future. Some imagined futures are incremental, 
whereas others predict sweeping, radical changes, underscoring how seemingly incre-
mental changes to technology (electric motor, grid interconnectivity, fuel cells) can lead 
to visionary storylines.
Moreover, the centrality of low-carbon, sustainability and/or energy efficiency is 
highly variable within the broader narratives of the different innovations but also within 
the various visions. These themes may be used or coopted by particular agendas to gain 
legitimacy and/or support – for instance, niche actors in vehicle automation are making 
sweeping and often highly generalized claims of benefits which, to date, are largely 
unsupported, context specific and contingent on a wider suite of assumptions about the 
energy system.
Fourth, as predicted, ideographs – a rhetorical manifestation of some ideology or 
recurring ideal – are recurrent across our visions. Visions at a narrow level about a 
cleaner type of natural gas, a safer or more ‘British’ reactor, a more widely dispersed fuel 
cell or smart meter or vehicle become about much more than that. They borrow from and 
connect with deeper ideographs of progress, environmental sustainability, liberty and 
autonomy, privacy, duty, and security (to name a few). Interestingly, visions can even 
deploy the same ideograph in starkly different ways, i.e., some ideographs of liberty and 
autonomy focus on ‘freedom to’ – to explore, innovate or build skills – whereas others 
emphasize ‘freedom from’ – from unemployment, insecurity, poverty or a degraded 
environment.
In this way, visions may fulfil a general social need for fantasy, and as such will likely 
continue to exist even as the specific innovations behind a low-carbon society change 
and evolve. On the other hand, some visions are created and used by powerful actors, 
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pursuing their own agendas, and utilizing a social need for visions to further their own 
end, such as limiting the spread of automation or electrification to conventional vehicles, 
or constraining the effects of smart meters or divestment. Indeed, sustainability in a 
majority of visions is seen narrowly as reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and that this 
can and has to be done via technological change – hinting that it does not necessitate 
other more difficult changes to behavior, lifestyle or social structure; in other contexts, 
the (environmental) sustainability ideograph can mean much more, considering nuclear 
waste and destroyed habitats for example. This is an example of the ‘flexibility’ of ideo-
graphs, and how they can be used differently in different contexts and by different actors. 
Visions can be used to open some futures and close others, and to narrowly redefine or 
even shut out some narratives.
Fifth, and last, the fantasy themes undergirding these 38 visions imply that the 
choices made by analysts, politicians, users, scientists and other stakeholders about 
low-carbon innovation are not always purposively rational. The prevalence of these 
visions strongly suggests that current discussions and broader narratives about energy 
technology and policy are seamlessly intertwined with compelling (and exciting and at 
times frightening) fantasies. The decisions we each make about energy systems tran-
scend economic self-interest, logic, and rationality and involve elements as diffuse as 
mass fantasy, individual optimism, dramatic storylines, symbolic cues, communal 
hope, heroes and villains, contradictions, business ambition, national pride and fear of 
uncertainty.
Because it fulfills these deeper needs, the provocative force of fantasy can positively 
stimulate and shape investment decisions, research trends and sociotechnical pathways 
that come to reject undesirable options and embrace desirable ones. Alternately, by dis-
torting from the rational towards our emotions and dreams, visions can enable powerful 
actors to hide serious problems and encourage incomplete solutions, clouding our judg-
ment. Energy fantasies and exaggerated rhetoric can become particularly hazardous if 
they blind us to the realities of new energy sources, and more mundane opportunities for 
energy efficiencies or reductions in energy consumption, by promising a golden tomor-
row only by ignoring the stark and growing problems of today. But they can also moti-
vate us to imagine and hope for possibilities that empower us to escape or perhaps 
transcend those very limitations. We need to both drive for particular, purposeful and 
transformative visions that resonate with a diverse set of stakeholders, but also acknowl-
edge their discursive struggles and contestations to ensure such visions are more socially 
appropriate and legitimate if they begin to become a reality.
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